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Nepal-India border row has flared up again despite the two sides repeatedly sitting down to resolve it at the top level. Perhaps, for the first time, the dispute has also percolated down to the level of the two peoples. Kalapani was mentioned as ‘disputed territory’ in bilateral agreements and joint press statements. Now both countries have included it in their national map.

India’s encroachment came to light during the Panchayat period, but no effort was made for negotiations. King Mahendra is blamed for allowing Indian troops into Kalapani after the 1962 India-China war, at India’s request, even though there are no official records or statements substantiating the blame. Former Nepali Ambassador to India, Bhek Bahadur Thapa, says King Mahendra did not personally allow Indian troops, “but he did maintain a studied silence, as raising the issue during the India-China standoff could have sent the wrong message that Nepal was taking a side”. According to Thapa, King Mahendra planned to take up this issue with India when the war ended, but he never came to it.

Some contend India had stationed its troops in Kalapani much before the 1962 war. A report submitted in 1988 by then Chief District Officer of Darchula district, Dilli Raj Joshi, mentions that India started encroaching on the Kalapani area as early as 1952. Similarly, former Brigadier General of Nepal Army Gopal Singh Bohara says Indian troops were in Kalapani at least since 1959. Both these instances appear in Ratan Bhandaro’s book, Atikramanko Chapetama Limpiyadhura Lipulek (‘Limpidyadhura Lipulkeh under Occupation’, 2015). It is hence hard to pin a date for the start of Indian occupation of Kalapani.

From the ground

In the early 1970s, State Minister for Forest Bahadur Singh Etwal, a politician from Darchula district, had publicly raised the issue of Kalapani encroachment for the first time. There were some efforts at the time to collect evidence on encroachment and keep an eye on border areas. On 16 July 1973, the Nagendra Prasad Rijal cabinet had formed a panel with representatives from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report on the encroachment from the ground. The report clearly mentioned that India had created an artificial Kali River to demarcate the border.

Eight years later, Dwarika Nath Dhungel, then Chief District Officer of Darchula (who would later go on to be a government secretary), visited Kalapani to prepare a ground report. The report asked the then government to clearly demarcate the Nepal-India border and deploy border security forces. “I submitted the report on encroachment to the home ministry. I later came to know that my report had been forwarded to the Survey Department for necessary action,” Dhungel says.

But formal talks on border demarcation started only in the 1980s. India and Nepal had discussed Kalapani and Lipulekh in 1981. In a November 2019 interview with Himal Khabarpatrika, former Director General of Survey Department Punya Prasad Oli talks of the border meeting: “In the meeting the Indian side, for the first time, said Lipulekh fell under their territory. They urged us not to raise the Lipulekh issue… and [said] they would not start the demarcation of the border from the disputed territory.”

There was no substantial progress till 1990. The dispute gained more prominence after left parties started broaching it that year—the year of the restoration of democracy. In 1992, lawmaker Prem Singh Dhami spoke about the Indian encroachment in the upper house. In his book, Ratan Bhandari writes of the ‘Mahakali Protection Commission Kailali-Kanchanpur’ submitting a memorandum to then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala in 1991, objecting to the Tanakpur water-sharing agreement. The memorandum also denounced India’s encroachment of Nepali land in Kalapani. 

Similarly, according to Bhandari, the then CPN-UML leader of Darchula Bir Bahadur Thagunna, had UML party general secretary Madan Kumar Bhandari take up the Kalapani encroachment issue. In response, Bhandari directed him to prepare a detailed report.

After that, following the signing of the 1996 Mahakali Treaty, the issue of the origin of the Kalai River entered public debate.

Summon to UN

On 29 June 1998, nine left parties wrote to then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, complaining about the presence of Indian forces at Kalapani. In response, the UN had replied that a proposal from Nepal could be considered if it came from the Nepali government. Similarly, the Maoist-aligned All Nepal Independent Student Union (Revolutionary) had in 2016 submitted a complaint to the then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, this time over the recent India-China trade agreement via Lipulekh.

With these developments, subsequent Nepal governments were forced to take up Kalapani with India. During the 1998 SAARC Summit in Dhaka, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala reminded his Indian counterpart Atal Bihari Vajpayee of Nepal’s historical claim over Kalapani. Upon his return to Kathmandu from the summit, PM Koirala said talks with India on Kalapani “had been positive”.

Then there were efforts at raising awareness on Indian occupation of Kalapani. On 19 May 1998, the then CPN (ML) organized a ‘Kalapani march’. “It was a difficult journey, I remember. It took us over 18 days to reach the Kalapani area,” recalls Deepak Prakash Bhatta, then a student leader and now a member of the federal lower house.

Ganesh Singh Thagunna, another member of the march and currently a lawmaker from Darchula, credits the march with establishing Kalapani in national discourse. In the same year, the CPN (ML) student union had organized another Kathmandu-Kalapani long march. For all these reasons, in the 1998-1999 period Kalapani had become a hot topic of discussion in Nepali political, media, and civil society circles.

During the insurgency, the Maoist party had also repeatedly raised the issue of Kalapani, demanding the withdrawal of Indian troops from the area. It even threatened military attacks to remove the Indian army post there. But the party would drop the agenda when it came out of the hiding in 2006.

Domestic efforts

Before that, on 10 August 1998, CPN-UML leader KP Sharma Oli had registered a motion in parliament demanding the withdrawal of Indian forces. The same Oli as prime minister in 2020 took the lead in amending the national charter to make Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura internal parts of Nepal.

Kalapani was again discussed in Kathmandu during the fifth meeting of the Joint Working Group on the India-Nepal Boundary, on 17 July 1998. Point seven of the meeting minutes reads: “The two sides continued their useful exchange of the views on the examination of the relevant facts relating to the demarcation of the boundary alignment in the western sector including Kalapani area. The Nepalese side stated that the boundary between Nepal and India in the area was the Kali River as explicitly laid down in article 5 of the treaty of Segowlee and therefore sought clarification from India side…”

After 2000, there was no discussion on Kalapani, but it continued to be mentioned in bilateral documents. The issue again came to the fore in 2015 when India and China agreed to the use of Lipulekh as a bilateral trading point. After that, India, in November 2019, issued a political map placing Kalapani within its territory.

Curiously, the Nepali Congress, Nepal’s oldest democratic party, mostly remained silent on the Kalapani dispute during this period. But after India issued its new map in 2019, the NC fully supported the Oli government’s move to amend the constitution to include Kalapani in the national map.

Indian establishment says

As in Kathmandu, there have been many debates on Kalapani in New Delhi. Kalapani became a political agenda in Nepal after 1990 but debates in New Delhi after the time were still largely confined among bureaucratic, security, and academic circles. Some politicians had raised this issue in India’s parliament but public discourse on it was minimal—at least until now.

There are various views in New Delhi. Most Indian politicians believe the two sides should find a middle point, and this view also has adherents in the bureaucracy. In a 1998 interview with Kantipur newspaper, then Indian Ambassador to Nepal KV Rajan had said that India was ready to give up its claim on Kalapani if Nepal could persuade it to do so based on solid evidence.

Indian politicians say Nepal was never serious about settling the dispute through dialogue. In his recent article in The Wire, an online portal, former Major General of Indian Army Ashok K. Mehta quotes the then Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral as saying, “if Nepal can prove Kalapani belongs to it, we will give it up.”

Likewise, in 1999, foreign minister Jaswant Singh, on a visit to Nepal, said India was prepared to resolve the Kalapani issue through negotiations. Again, nothing happened.

On 26 July 2000, then member of Lok Sabha and current Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath questioned foreign minister Singh on efforts to resolve Kalapani amicably. Singh replied, “There is a difference in perception between India and Nepal on the boundary alignment in the western sector of the India-Nepal border, where the Kalapani area is located.” Singh said the Indian government was aware that some people might exploit such differences.

Similarly, on 7 December 2000, some members of India’s Rajya Sabha asked Ajit Kumar Panja, then Minister of State for External Affairs, about media reports on talks between India, Nepal and China to settle Kalapani. In his response, Panja questioned the veracity of such reports.

Then, on 6 December 2007, border issues were again discussed in the Indian parliament. This time, Pranab Mukherjee, then Minister for External Affairs, pointed the finger at Nepal: “The shifting of course in Susta region of the Gandak River, the mid-stream of which formed the boundary as per Treaty of Sugauli of 1816, has resulted in claims/counterclaims by both sides in this segment. The government is constantly monitoring the situation with a view to prevent encroachments by the Nepalese side.”

Security types differ

India’s security establishment, mainly its army, sees things differently. For it Kalapani is a strategic vantage point from which it would be unwise to withdraw. “Demarcation of two short segments of our boundary with Nepal—Kalapani and Susta—is yet to be completed. Of these, Kalapani is strategically important, as it determines the tri-junction between India, Nepal and China,” V.P. Haran, a former Indian ambassador to Bhutan and Afghanistan, said while speaking at a 2017 event organized by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs at the Central University of Tamil Nadu.

Kalapani as such is far more important to India than other disputed areas such as Susta. The security establishment has thus floated the idea of a land swap; India would not give up Kalapani but allocate the same area of land to Nepal in some other place.

Haran’s view is reflective of the Indian security establishment that argues that the militarily important Kalapani ‘should not be politicized’.

In his 9 Aug 2017 write-up in the Indian Defense Review, Lt Gen, (Dr) JS Bajwa of the Indian Army, says: “It [China] is also instigating Nepal to raise a dispute with regard to the Western Tri-junction of Nepal-Tibet-India in the Kalapani-Lipulekh Pass area where, in fact, none exists.” 

Likewise, Lt Gen of Indian Army Chief, Prakash Katoch, in his recent article in the same publication, writes “aggressive actions of PLA are directly linked to Nepal objecting to the road in Pithoragarh district of Uttrakhand to Lipulekh Pass…” Katoch thinks Lipulekh Pass is on the LAC between India and China Occupied Tibet, and Nepal, as such, has no claim on it.  

Nepal’s new map, he further writes, follows China’s pattern of cartographic aggression and has obviously been issued at China’s behest. “To hide its complicity, China gave a statement out of the blue that Kalapani is a bilateral issue between Nepal and India that both sides should resolve peacefully. There was no reason for China to issue such a statement since there neither was an India-Nepal standoff at Kalapani nor any physical fights like the PLA is indulging in.”

Likewise, elaborating on the strategic importance of Kalapani, Maj Gen Ashwani Siwach (retd) of Indian Army writes in the same magazine, “This road is not only important to India for movement of pilgrims to Kailash Mansarover, tourism and trade, but has significant strategic importance for logistic build up and fast induction of troops against China.”

Along with the political and security establishment, there has been a lot of discussions on Kalapani among Indian intellectuals and policymakers. In his paper published by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, a think-tank in New Delhi, Alok Kumar Gupta cites official sources in India as claiming that administrative and revenue records dating back to the 1830s—and now with the UP state government—show Kalapani area as traditionally being administered as a part of India’s Pithoragarh district.

Local perspective

Amid debates in Kathmandu and New Delhi, less attention has been paid on how local people in border areas around Kalapani see the issue. Lawmakers elected from border areas say local people are firmly against Indian encroachment, but they face great difficulty when tensions flare up between Kathmandu and New Delhi. People from these areas depend on India for jobs, day-to-day essentials, education, and health facilities.

“When there is a dispute, Indians treat locals badly and humiliate those who go to India to buy essentials,” says lawmaker Thangunna. The locals want all outstanding issues on Kalapani resolved diplomatically, rather than through street protests. They would like to see a quick resolution of the current dispute as well. But seldom does Kathmandu (or New Delhi) listen to them.

Mahanta Thakur was a top Nepali Congress (NC) leader before he formed his own Tarai-Madhes Loktrantrik Party in 2007, immediately after the first Madhesi Movement. Had he not left the NC, Thakur was the most likely candidate for the country’s president from the party. Instead, the nomination and the post went to Ram Baran Yadav, another Congress stalwart. Thakur is a firm believer in parliamentary democracy. 

In 1996 Baburam Bhattarai was already the second-in-command and the party’s chief ideologue when the Maoists launched their insurgency. But he severed ties with the mother Maoist party in 2015, following the promulgation of the new national charter, and formed his own party, Naya Shakti Nepal. The new party embraced socialist and progressive agendas. 

Upendra Yadav was a school teacher before becoming a revolutionary Maoist and the champion of the Madhesi cause. His burning in 2007 of the interim constitution led to his arrest, catapulting him into national politics. In the first Constituent Assembly election, his new party, Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, emerged as the largest Madhes-based outfit. Yadav is most comfortable working with left parties. 

Rajendra Mahato, a seasoned Madhesi leader, was once associated with the Nepal Sadbhawana Party. This party was active in Madhesi politics after the 1990 changes, but has since merged with Rastriya Janata Party Nepal. Ideologically, he is close to ‘democratic’, as opposed to ‘progressive’, forces. 

Mahendra Raya Yadav comes from the CPN-UML, and joined various Madhes-based parties after the 2006 political changes. Likewise, Ashok Rai was UML vice-chair before he formed his own Sanghiya Samajbadi Party. In 2015, he merged his party with Upendra Yadav’s Madhesi Janadhikar Forum. But the senior Janajati leader has failed to get much support from Janajati groups. 

All these leaders from diverse backgrounds are now collectively under the umbrella of the new Janata Samajbadi Party-Nepal (JSPN). In the federal lower house, it is the third largest party after the Nepal Communist Party and the NC, and projects itself as an alternative political force. 

The new party also includes leaders such as Sarad Singh Bhandari (from NC), and Anil Kumar Jha and Raj Kishor Yadav (various Madhes-based parties). There are also some junior leaders in the JSPN who started their politics during the party-less Panchayat system. The new party is thus a curious mixture of ethnicities, ideologies, and classes. 

Merger star aligns 

What prompted them to come together? According to Madhes watchers, the unification had been in the cards for a while. It got the final push on April 20, when Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli brought a new ordinance to make it easier to divide political parties; doing so with the express purpose of splitting Madhesi parties and strengthening his two-thirds lower house majority. 

Oli’s strategy was to split the big Madhes-based parties and use CK Raut—the leader of a secessionist movement in Madhes that Oli helped bring to national mainstream—to improve his position in Madhes. To forestall this, Samajbadi Party and Janata Party, with 17 and 16 seats in the federal lower house respectively, announced their merger on April 22. Otherwise a section of the Samajabadi Party was all set to join the Oli government after registering a separate party under new rules. 

The Madhesi forces faced an ‘existential crisis’. Mainly after the unification of the CPN-UML with the CPN (Maoist Center), the Madhesi outfits feared being permanently shut out of power. In the past, even fringe Madhesi parties had played kingmakers, making and breaking governments in Kathmandu. But with the consolidated communist party at the helm and changes in political party rules, that was no longer an option. 

According to new legal provisions, in a national election, a party has to cross the threshold of three percent overall valid votes under the Proportional Representation category and get at least one seat under the First-Past-the-Post category. Only then it is recognized as a national party. This explains why there were only four national parties after the 2017 elections, while eight national parties and over two-dozen others had emerged after the 2013 CA elections. The new provisions forced smaller parties to consolidate. 

The utter dominance of the NCP in national politics made these proponents of identity politics band together. With the local elections just two years away, they didn’t have much time to lose. 

Ideological muddle

Ideological differentiation is an important concern for political parties. What is the core ideology of the JSPN with its diverse cast of characters then? Party leaders say its ideology of ‘advanced democratic socialism’ sets the JSPN apart from other political outfits. 

“BP Koirala embraced democratic socialism, mainly focusing on economic equality and individual freedom. Our party professes ‘advanced democratic socialism’ by incorporating new issues such as the end of social, cultural and caste discriminations, and the consolidation of federal and republican orders,” says party leader Keshav Jha. He also states that the new party is in favor of inclusive and participatory democracy. 

But Madhes watchers reckon the new party’s ideology is still unclear. According to Rajesh Ahiraj, “The JSPN has leaders who served the NC, the CPN-UML, the Madhes-based parties as well as the Panchayat regime. Carving out a clear ideology is thus difficult for it”. But lack of clarity could also be to the party’s benefit, adds Ahiraj, as it could forestall a split along ideological lines. 

According to another analyst of Madhesi politics, Tula Narayan Shah, there are currently three major currents in national politics. Some parties focus on nationalism, some focus more on development, while still others focus on identity politics. “The new party’s major plank is identity-based politics,” Shah says.

Meanwhile, the JSPN’s Raj Kishore Yadav says that with the formation of a strong alternative force, Kathmandu will be under greater pressure to heed the Madhesi voices, including the crucial issue of the constitution amendment. “The NCP and NC are traditional forces. We are a new, alternative political force that stands for inclusive and participatory democracy,” says Yadav.  

Organizational headaches

Management of party leaders from center to grassroots is also problematic. Plus, the old personality clashes in Madhes-based parties could resurface. 

“Our primary focus now is settlement of internal organizational issues. We have to amalgamate the various organizations affiliated with separate parties pre-unification,” says Raj Kishor Yadav. 

When six Madhes-based parties united in 2017 to form the Rastriya Janata Party Nepal, there was a huge problem with managing all the new leaders. So the party adopted the presidium system, where six leaders served as presidents on a rotational basis. “In order to adjust all top leaders who now fall under the JSPN rubric, we will continue to follow the principle of collective leadership,” says Yadav.  

During the JSPN’s registration, Mahantha Thakur and Upendra Yadav were named party chairs, while Baburam Bhattarai, Ashok Rai and Rajendra Mahato were declared senior leaders. “In a top-heavy party like the JSPN, there are bound to be personality clashes. In fact, that would be JSPN’s biggest challenge going ahead,” says writer Pranab Kharel, a sociologist and a close follower of Madhesi politics. 

Another vital issue is the constituency of the new party. A combination of two largely Madhes-based parties, the JSPN’s base will continue to be Madhes. As it is, the new outfit commands over 50 percent local governments in Tarai-Madhes. But the party also incorporates many powerful leaders from the hills. 

The JSPN is projecting itself as a national party. But analysts say while there is a chance of it holding on to its Madhes base, it will have a tough time expanding in hill areas and in Kathmandu.  

“It will struggle to attract the hill’s Janajati constituency. Nor will the Khas-Arya folks support it easily,” says political analyst Shah. He fears that in due course hill leaders like Baburam Bhattarai and Ashok Rai could come to dominate the JSPN. In that case, the party could face an identity crisis. 

Yet the party has started consolidating the Janajati constituency and plans on a big alliance of identity-based political forces. According to leaders from the two merging parties, the next national movement will be launched under the banner of ‘Rastriya Mukti Andolan’, with the goal of accommodating Janajati and other forces that feel betrayed by the 2015 constitution. 

Can’t go national 

Analyst Ahiraj suggests the party will struggle even in Madhes. “The new party cannot win support in Madhes as it is no longer a Madhes-based party, nor does it carry Madhesi ideology,” he says. According to Ahiraj, the NC, whose traditional vote bank is Madhes, could gain from the ideological muddle in the JSPN.  

Political analyst and Madhesi intellectual Chandra Kishore echoes Ahiraj. He says there is a feeling among grassroots level Madhesi cadres that Madhesi leaders are gradually abandoning their base in the name of forming a national party. There are other problems too. “During its formation, the party has not been inclusive. There is no representation of Madhesi Dalits, and the Tharu community has been ignored,” says Kishore. 

Analyst Shah, however, believes the party will do well in Madhes even though he is not so sure about its prospects in the hills and in Kathmandu. Baburam Bhattarai, Ashok Rai and Rajendra Shrestha who represent the JSPN’s non-Madhesi faces all struggled in the 2017 national elections. For instance, Bhattarai won the election from Gorkha only because of his alliance with the Nepali Congress. The other two lost, as they struggled to get the Janajati support.

The Madhesi leaders will also struggle to increase their appeal in hilly and mountain regions as well as in Kathmandu Valley. According to experts, the 2007 Madhes movement created a gulf between Madhesi and Pahadi communities in Madhes—a gulf which is yet to be breached. According to Shah, Madhesi population more easily accepts Pahadi leaders rather than the other way around. For instance, Baburam Bhattarai and Ashok Rai are somehow accepted in Madhes but other Madhesi leaders are not as easily accepted in the hills. 

According to Shah, problems will crop up even within the party. “In intra-party elections, leaders and cadres from hill constituencies are unlikely to vote for Madhesi leaders,” he says. Sociologist Kharel adds, “Their tactical alliance to establish identity-based politics notwithstanding, there has never been cordial relations between Madhesi and Janajati constituencies.” 

Brief History of Madhes-based parties 

Bedananda Jha established the first Madhes-based party, the Tarai Congress, in 1951 after breaking away from the Nepali Congress. Nepal Sadbhawana Party, formed in 1985, represented Madhes in the post-1990 dispensation. Between 1990 and 2006, the NSP itself would repeatedly split and coalesce into new parties. But it was only in the aftermath of the 2006 political changes that the Madhesi parties started playing a decisive role in national politics. 

A group of Madhesi activists led by Upendra Yadav launched the first Madhesi movement following the promulgation of the interim constitution in 2007, after federalism had found no place in the interim charter. Yadav emerged as the undisputed Madhesi leader and registered the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Nepal (MJF). 

Later, Nepali Congress leader Bijaya Kumar Gachhadar and Sarad Singh Bhandari joined the Upendra-Yadav led MJF just before the first Constituent Assembly elections in 2008. At the same time, senior NC leader Mahanta Thakur, Sadbhawana leader Hridayesh Tripathi, UML’s Mahendra Raya Yadav, and Ram Chandra Raya of Rastriya Prajatantra Party formed Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party.  

Gachhadar split from the MJF to join the Madhav Kumar Nepal-led government. After some time, Sarad Singh Bhandari and JP Gupta also formed separate parties. 

Just before the 2017 national elections, six Madhes-based parties announced their unification, all merging into the Rastriya Janata Party Nepal. Similarly, the Upendra Yadav-led party united with Ashok Rai-led Sanghiya Samajbadi to form Sanghiya Samajbadi Forum Nepal. Later there was unification between Samajbadi and Naya Shakti Nepal under Baburam Bhattarai. Now, the Janata Samajbadi Party Nepal has been formed after the merger of the Samajbadi Party and the Rastriya Janata Party Nepal. 

The head of a communist government claiming a religious figure from ancient mythology for his country was, admittedly, a touch strange. Yet Prime Minister KP Oli seemed to know what he was doing. Unlike in India, religion is proving to be a poor tool for political mobilization in Nepal. Yet when you dare claim the chief deity of the ruling party in India, the traditional hegemon, people at home are bound to notice. Is it possible that Lord Ram was born in Nepal, many of them questioned? As the historicity of Ram’s birth or his birthplace cannot be established, what is the harm in believing that Ram was a fellow Nepali from Thori near Birgunj?  

When the prime minister’s remark had the predictable effect, at least in India, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set out to control the damage. Oli understands a complete rupture with India is also not in his interest. “The remarks made by the Prime Minister are not linked to any political subject and have no intention at all to hurt the feeling and sentiment of anyone,” read the MoFA statement. “As there have been several myths and references about Shri Ram and the places associated with him, the Prime Minister was simply highlighting the importance of further studies and research of the vast cultural geography the Ramayana represents...”

PM Oli’s Bhanu Jayanti speech was miles from ‘highlighting the importance of further studies and research’. Nonetheless, all the political analysts APEX talked to agreed that the prime minister was not taking a stab at religious politics. Shreekrishna Aniruddh Gautam says the use of religion as a political tool can never be ruled out. Yet he reckons its salience as a political tool is decreasing in Nepal. “Rather than backing for a particular religion, PM Oli’s remark represents a continuation of Mahendra-era nationalism. By raising an issue that was sure to pinch India he was trying to cement his hold in his own party,” Gautam says. 

Senior journalist Dev Prakash Tripathi, who is leading a campaign called ‘Matribhumi ka Lagi Nepali’ to restore the Hindu kingdom, says religion came to be politicized in Nepal mainly after the 2006 political changes. Yet the NC district-level leader in Dhading too disclaims the view that Oli’s motive was to drum up support from Nepali Hindus. He says existing political parties have lost people’s trust and they cannot be trusted to take up the sacred issue of Hinduism. 

It was the erstwhile Nepali monarchy that established Hinduism as a state religion. The monarchs wanted to propagate the myth of their holy Hindu lineage, with the reigning monarch projected as no less than an avatar of Lord Vishnu, and as such above the law. In republican Nepal, the country’s democratically elected rulers continue to use religion. The goal this time is to employ the fabled opium of the masses to puff up the rulers’ anti-India nationalist credentials. 

On July 13, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli made a controversial statement over the birthplace of Lord Ram. He accused India of creating an artificial Ayodhya in India, when Ram was actually born in Nepal, in Thori village west of Birgunj.

PM Oli’s statement invited fierce criticism in Nepal and India alike. Leaders of Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in particular were livid.  

After the opposition to PM Oli’s statement escalated in India, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to tone things down. “The remarks made by the Prime Minister are not linked to any political subject and have no intention at all to hurt the feeling and sentiment of anyone,” read the statement. “As there have been several myths and references about Shri Ram and the places associated with him, the Prime Minister was simply highlighting the importance of further studies and research of the vast cultural geography the Ramayana represents...”

But the prime minister’s claim also resonated with sections of Nepalis who would like to believe a revered deity like Ram was born in their country. Thus, some speculated, Oli really did want to gain the sympathies of the country’s Hindu population.

In India, the Hindu nationalist BJP had come to power for a second term on a strong Hindu nationalist plank. Some espy the emergence of a similar movement in Nepal to challenge its current secular status, perhaps with the help of some senior BJP leaders who have lent their voice in support of a Hindu Nepal.

Currently, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) is the only notable political force in Nepal supporting the restoration of monarchy and Hindu state. But the party has of late struggled as an electoral force, and failed to win a single directly contested seat in the 2017 federal and provincial elections.

There are voices in Nepali Congress, the main opposition, in favor of a Hindu state. In the upcoming general convention scheduled next February, Hinduism could become a prominent agenda. The ruling Nepal Communist Party too professes secularism, yet many of their leaders also have a soft spot for Hinduism. This is perhaps understandable as a sizable chunk of their electorate are devout Hindus. But how big is this support?  

Politically irrelevant

Political analyst Shreekrishna Aniruddh Gautam says the use of religion as a political tool can never be ruled out. Yet he reckons its salience as a political tool is decreasing in Nepal. “Rather than backing for a particular religion, PM Oli’s remark represents a continuation of Mahendra-era nationalism. By raising this issue that was sure to pinch India he was trying to consolidate his hold in his own party,” Gautam avers.

Another political analyst Hari Roka also does not believe the PM’s statement on Ram was intended to please Nepali Hindus but rather “to cover up his failure on both domestic and foreign fronts”. Roka says religion-based politics has already failed in Nepal.

Senior journalist Dev Prakash Tripathi, who is leading a campaign called ‘Matribhumi ka Lagi Nepali’ aimed at restoring the Hindu Kingdom, says the issue of religion was politicized in Nepal mainly after the 2006 political changes. Yet the NC district-level leader in Dhading too disclaims the view that Oli’s motive was to drum up support from Nepali Hindus.

“Secularism was not something people had asked for during the second Jana Andolan. Political parties inserted it in the new constitution at the behest of foreign forces,” Tripathi says. Matribhumi ka Lagi Nepali, which has brought together NC leaders and cadres who are in favor of Hindu state, has now launched a signature campaign for the restoration of the Hindu state. He says existing political parties have lost people’s trust and as such cannot take up the issue of Hinduism.

According to him, if a new force takes up revival of Hindu state as a key agenda it will win great support. “I am confident that a new Hindu nationalist party will emerge in Nepal as a large chunk of the Hindu population is unhappy with the country’s secular status,” Tripathi says.

Self-appointed gods

It was the erstwhile Nepali monarchy that established Hinduism as a state religion. This was done as the monarchs wanted to propagate the myth of their holy Hindu lineage, with the reigning monarch being no less than an avatar of Lord Vishnu, and as such above the law.

The democratic constitution of Nepal adopted in 1959 was silent on religion. Then the 1962 panchayat-era charter declared Nepal a Hindu kingdom. When a new constitution was promulgated in 1990 after the people’s movement, the new charter retained Nepal’s Hindu status despite protests from minority groups that wanted a secular state.

Between 1960 and 2006, the monarchy actively promoted Hinduism with the backing of Hindu organizations like the World Hindu Federation Nepal. In fact, the organization is still on its mission to promote Hinduism and monarchy. Yet the growing consensus among Nepali intellectuals and the political class is that Hinduism can no more be used as the primary tool of political mobilization in Nepal. The people of Nepal have still less appetite for a return of monarchy.